Market Effects of Democratization: In TNR, Dan Drezner looks at one of the conundrums that Arab politics drops in the lap of U.S. foreign policy: Should we push for democratization in countries, like Pakistan or Saudi Arabia, where a democratically elected government could conceivably be more Islamist, and more dangerous, than the current one. Says Drezner:

Dealing with strategically located, non-democratic countries ruled by vulnerable elites-- countries like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia--has always been a complicated chore. When advocating democratization and/or human rights, U.S. policy--regardless of party--has been to treat these countries as too important to pressure into liberalizing, or the results of liberalization too volatile to tolerate.

One of Drezner's example's, Pakistan, illustrates the challenge. Some elements of Pakistan's government already support Islamist policies, and Musharraf's opposition has done little, other than make him a walking target. But, Drezner continues, democratization does have one clear advantage, namely the transparency that democracy, like the free market, brings. To put it simply, at least we know where we stand when analyzing a democratic country. The actual will of the people is on display, not in a manufactured Arab-street show, but through voting patterns. Yes, there is the danger that an elected regime will be more radical than "our bastard." But, these days, our bastards are doing a lot of hiding behind the supposed threat of domestic unrest (Musharraf less than most), a tactic that may itself be a pose (think Saudi Arabia) that furthers the interests of the ruling elite:

Fifteen years ago, Robert Putnam demonstrated that leaders with domestic constraints on their bargaining position have an advantage in international negotiations. The reason is that, in a game of chicken, leaders with restive domestic opponents can act like they've thrown the steering wheel out the window: They can always claim that, even if they want to accommodate U.S. pressure, they have little choice in the matter since accommodation would collapse their regime. At times they may even be telling the truth.

Does this ignore the inherent danger of the gamble? Not really, says Drezner:

The $64,000 question, of course, is what would happen if democratization led to extremist rule. This is undeniably a scary prospect. Still, the case of Iran, whose leadership seems increasingly out of step with its younger, pro-American generations, suggests that radical elements will experience difficulties retaining popular support over the longer run. Likewise, Hugo Chavez's attempts to pursue dogmatically anti-American policies in Venezuela have been met with increasing opposition. Anti-American jihads are of limited utility if they fail to deliver the goods.

Iran is a fascinating example here. Within a generation of the revolution, Iran's "street" has become the most consistently pro-American in the region. Though the country is Islamic, it's people seem to have rejected the pan-Arabist fantasies of the past few decades, partly, of course, because Iranians are not Arabs; in part, too, because the Iranians fought a brutal war with the pan-Arabist extraordinaire, Saddam Hussein; but also, in part, because they've seen the radical Islamist state up close. On top of that is the mundane drudgery of governing, which is a de-radicalizing force in itself. (An underexplored theme in world politics is the metamorphasis of revolutionary governments into the image of their predecessors.) One can readily see why Arafat, for example, doesn't really care to have a Palestinian state in his lifetime. He's then have to show results, success. He's have to govern, instead of simply agitating.

Read the article in full. Whether you agree or not, it's a fine piece of analysis.